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Abstract—With the advent of the era of big data, deep learning
has become a prevalent building block in a variety of machine
learning or data mining tasks, such as signal processing, network
modeling and traffic analysis, to name a few. The massive user
data crowdsourced plays a crucial role in the success of deep
learning models. However, it has been shown that user data may
be inferred from trained neural models and thereby exposed
to potential adversaries, which raises information security and
privacy concerns. To address this issue, recent studies leverage
the technique of differential privacy to design private-preserving
deep learning algorithms. Albeit successful at privacy protection,
differential privacy degrades the performance of neural models.
In this paper, we develop ADADP, an adaptive and fast convergent
learning algorithm with a provable privacy guarantee. ADADP
significantly reduces the privacy cost by improving the conver-
gence speed with an adaptive learning rate and mitigates the
negative effect of differential privacy upon the model accuracy
by introducing adaptive noise. The performance of ADADP is
evaluated on real-world datasets. Experiment results show that
it outperforms state-of-the-art differentially private approaches
in terms of both privacy cost and model accuracy.
Index Terms—crowdsourcing, information security and pri-
vacy, differential privacy, deep learning, adaptive, fast convergent
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
The past decade has witnessed the remarkable success of
deep learning techniques in various machine learning / data
mining tasks, such as signal processing [1], network modeling
[2] and traffic analysis [3]. The great success relies heavily on
the massive collection of user data, which, however, often raise
severe privacy and security issues. For example, Fredrikson et
al. [4], demonstrates that the individual privacy information in
the training dataset can be recovered by repeatedly querying
the output probabilities of a disease recognition classifier built
upon a convolutional neural network (CNN). Existing privacy
concerns are likely to discourage users from sharing their data
and thereby obstruct the future development of deep learning
itself.
This paper studies the problem of user privacy protection
in the training process of neural models. We consider the
white-box scenario where an adversary has access to the
parameters of a trained model. In this scenario, many service
providers allow users to download models to their personal
devices (e.g., computers and smart phones), and malicious
users could analyze the parameters of the model which may
expose personal information in the training dataset.
B. Limitations of Prior Art
To address the privacy issue, several differential privacy
(DP) [5] based approaches were proposed, which may be
classified into two categories: data obfuscation and gradient
obfuscation. Data obfuscation based approaches obfuscate data
with noise prior to potential exposure of sensitive informa-
tion [6], [7]. These approaches may suffer from significant
accuracy degradation of the trained model. The reason is
that to guarantee the differential privacy bound, the added
noise may be excessively intense and make differently labeled
training instances almost indistinguishable. In contrast to data
obfuscation, gradient obfuscation based approaches add noise
to the gradient in the training process [8], [9], [10], [11],
[12], [13]. However, they may not circumvent the accuracy
degradation issue completely. Although some methods aim
to improve the accuracy of gradient obfuscation [11], [13],
they have three key limitations. First, the privacy cost is
high because the convergence speed of these methods is
slow while the privacy cost is accumulated for each gradient
calculation. Second, the accuracy still cannot meet the high-
precision requirements of many applications since they add
identically distributed noise to all components of the gradient
which results in large distortion of the original gradient. Third,
these methods are computationally inefficient because they
need to evaluate the model multiple times or solve a large-
scale optimization problem per iteration which make the task
computationally prohibitive.
C. Proposed Approach
In this paper, we propose ADADP, an adaptive and fast
convergent approach to differentially private deep learning.
Our key observation is that different components of the
gradient have inhomogeneous sensitivity to the training data.
In light of this observation, ADADP mitigates the influence
of noise on the model performance by adaptively sampling
noise from different Gaussian distributions, based on the sen-
sitivity of each component. In the first stage, ADADP adjusts
the learning rate in an adaptive manner based on historical
gradients such that infrequently updated components tend to
have a larger learning rate. Then, ADADP samples noise from
different Gaussian distributions according to the sensitivity of
each gradient component and constructs differentially private
gradients by adding the sensitivity-dependent noise to the
original gradient. In this way, Gaussian noise with a lower
variance is added to components with a smaller sensitivity.
Compared to existing data obfuscation and gradient obfus-
cation based methods, ADADP has three key advantages.
First, the privacy cost of ADADP is low because it exhibits
remarkable improvement in the convergence speed due to an
adaptive learning rate. Since the privacy cost is accumulated
on each gradient update, a faster rate of convergence indicates
that training a model using ADADP incurs lower privacy cost.
Second, ADADP achieves both a provable privacy guarantee
and a comparable accuracy to non-differentially private mod-
els simultaneously. We will show later that this is attained
by adding adaptive noise to different gradient components,
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depending on their sensitivity. As the model converges, we
will see a decrease in the expected sensitivity of each gradient
component, which thereby reduces the variance of noise
distribution. In other words, in contrast to prior works, the
noise distribution of ADADP is adaptive to not only different
gradient components but also different training iterations.
Third, ADADP is computationally efficient since it does not
need to solve any optimization problem to determine the noise
distribution at each iteration, in sharp contrast to [13] that
requires solving a large-scale non-convex optimization prob-
lems. We design an efficient scheme for adjusting the noise
distribution and the scheme is evaluated via both theoretical
analysis and numerical experiments.
D. Technical Challenges and Solutions
First, it is technically challenging to mathematically analyze
the influence of the noise distribution upon the prediction
performance, in light of the complicated nature of deep neural
networks. As an alternative, we analyze the sufficient and
necessary condition for noise distributions to guarantee the
target differential privacy level. The condition involves an
inequality with respect to the sensitivity of each gradient
component and the variance of each corresponding Gaussian
distribution. Based on the analysis, we conduct an experiment
to compare the influence of different noise distributions upon
the original function which can be seen as a query on a
dataset. According to the theoretical and experiment results,
we propose a heuristic that adapts the noise distributions to the
sensitivity of each gradient component. Finally, we perform
another experiment to verify the effectiveness of this heuristic
according to the influence of noise on the gradient descent
algorithm which is widely used for optimizing deep learning
models.
Another technical challenge is to compute the privacy cost
without any assumptions on the parameters such as the noise
level and the sampling ratio. This is in sharp contrast to
prior methods. For example, the moments accountant method
requires the noise level σ ≥ 1 and the sampling ratio q < 116σ
[10]. To remove the assumptions, we use a technique termed
subsampled Re´nyi differential privacy (RDP) [14], which com-
putes the privacy cost by analyzing the privacy amplification
in the subsampling scenario. And importantly, it requires no
assumption on the parameters in the analysis [15].
E. Summary of Experiment Results
We evaluated the privacy cost, the accuracy and the com-
putational efficiency of ADADP and baselines on two real
datasets: MNIST [16] and CIFAR-10 [17]. The results show
that ADADP outperforms state-of-the-art methods with 50%
privacy cost reduction. On MNIST and CIFAR-10, ADADP
achieves an improvement of up to 4.3% and 3.5%, respectively,
in accuracy over state-of-the-art methods. Our experimental
results also show that the processing time of ADADP at each
iteration is much less than that of [13], [11], validating the
computational efficiency of ADADP.
II. RELATED WORK
To protect sensitive information in crowdsourced data col-
lection, differentially private crowdsourcing mechanisms were
designed [18], [19], [20], [21]. To preclude personal infor-
mation from being inferred and/or identified from neural
models [4], a line of works emerged which applied DP to deep
learning [8], [9], [22], [10], [23], [24], [25], [26], [11], [12],
[27], [28], [13]. For instance, [24], [26] integrate DP into a
teacher-student framework to protect data on student nodes.
[9], [8], [29], [27] study transferring features or gradients
with privacy control in collaborative deep learning. [18],
[19], [20], [21] apply DP to personal data collection. In
the above works, black-box attacks are (implicitly) assumed,
i.e., the learned model is inaccessible to adversaries. Other
works studied privacy protection in a more realistic white-
box model where adversaries may have full knowledge of the
model [10], [25], [11], [12], [13]. [10] proposes a differentially
private gradient descent algorithm DPSGD by adding Gaussian
noise to the gradient. [12] uses an adaptive learning rate to
improve the convergence rate and reduce the privacy cost.
[25] introduces the Laplace mechanism such that the privacy
budget consumption is independent of the number of training
steps. [11] allocates different privacy budgets to each training
iteration to counteract the influence of noise on the gradient. In
all aforementioned works, however, the noise on each gradient
component follows the same probability distribution. As a
result, the original gradient is distorted to a large extent.
Although [13] samples noise from different distributions for
each gradient component, solving a large-scale optimization is
required at every step.
III. OUR APPROACH
To reduce the privacy cost, ADADP uses an adaptive learn-
ing rate for acceleration of the convergence. Additionally,
ADADP adds inhomogeneous and adaptive noise to different
coordinates of the gradient based on their sensitivity in order
to mitigate the influence of noise on the model performance.
The next two subsections elaborate the adaptive learning rate
and noise respectively. Then we present ADADP and show its
differential privacy guarantee.
A. Adaptive Learning Rate
The most popular method for training deep models is the
gradient-descent-type algorithms. They iteratively update the
parameters of a model by moving them in the direction
opposite to the gradient of the loss function evaluated on the
training data. The loss function L is the difference between
the predictions and the true labels. To minimize the loss
L(θ), stochastic gradient descent (SGD) randomly chooses a
subset of training data (denoted by S) at each iteration and
performs the update θ ← θ − η 1|S|
∑
i∈S ∇θL(θ, xi). SGD
poses several challenges, e.g., selection of a proper learning
rate and avoidance of local minimum traps.
More advanced optimizers, including RMSPROP, ADAM,
ADADELTA and NADAM, are proposed to address the above
issues. They adjust the learning rate on a per-parameter basis
in an adaptive manner and scale the coordinates of the gradient
according to historical data.
ADADP uses an adaptive strategy similar to that of RM-
SPROP. Nevertheless, we would like to note that the frame-
work proposed in this paper is applicable to other adaptive
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gradient-descent-type algorithms. Recall the update of RM-
SPROP
E[g2]t ← (1− γ)E[g2]t−1 + γ(gt)2 (1)
θt ← θt−1 − η gt√
E[g2]t + 0
,
where θt denotes the parameters at step t, gt denotes the
original gradient, η is the learning rate, and 0 is the smoothing
term (in case that the denominator is 0).
In ADADP, let ∆θt denote the update term at step t and we
have ∆θt = g˜t√E[g˜2]t+0 where g˜t is the noisy gradient which
has been added Gaussian noise. In other words, ADADP uses
the denominator
√
E[g˜2]t + 0 to adjust the learning rate η in
an adaptive manner.
B. Adaptive Noise
The intuition of adaptive noise is that different coordinates
of the gradient exhibit inhomogeneous sensitivities due to their
different values. It significantly affects the direction of the
gradient if noise with higher intensity is added to coordinates
with a smaller value, and vice versa. In light of this intuition,
ADADP clips the gradient and adds Gaussian noise with a
smaller/larger variance to dimensions of the clipped gradient
with a smaller/larger sensitivity.
Formally, we define the `2-sensitivity of a function f as
∆f = maxD,D′‖f(D) − f(D′)‖2 where D,D′ are two
datasets which differ in only one record. Correspondingly,
adaptive noise is sampled from Gaussian distributions with dif-
ferent variances based on the `2-sensitivity of each dimension.
In the meanwhile, adaptive noise must satisfy the constraint
of differential privacy. To guarantee this, we first present the
following lemma which provides the theoretical foundation of
adaptive noise.
Lemma 1. Suppose mechanism M(D) = f(D)+Z, where D
is the input dataset, f(·) is a m-dimension function that ∆f ≤
1 and noise Z ∼ N (0, σ2∗), is (, δ)-differentially private, then
mechanism M ′(D) = f ′(D) + Z ′, where f ′(·) is also a m-
dimension function, Z ′ = (z′1, . . . , z
′
m)
T and ∀i ∈ [m], z′i ∼
N (0, σ2i ), is also (, δ)-differentially private if
∑m
i=1
s2i
σ2i
≤ 1σ2∗
where si is the `2-sensitivity of the ith dimension of f ′(·).
To prove Lemma 1, we need an auxiliary result which
involves the sufficient and necessary condition on the privacy
loss variable to satisfy (, δ)-DP.
Lemma 2 (Analytical differential privacy [30]). A mechanism
M is (, δ)-DP if and only if for each D,D′, the following
holds:
Pr (lM,D,D′ ≥ )− e Pr (lM,D′,D ≤ −) < δ, (2)
where lM,D,D′ is the privacy loss variable defined by
ln Pr(M(D)=o)Pr(M(D′)=o) .
We are now ready to present the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. The first step is to show that lM,D,D′ is a Gaus-
sian random variable. Let (r1, . . . , rm) = o − f(D). We
consider the worst case of lM,D,D′ . In this case, we have
(s1, . . . , sm) = f(D)−f(D′), which yields (r1+s1, . . . , rm+
sm) = o− f(D′). As a result, the following equations hold
ln
Pr(M(D) = o)
Pr(M(D′) = o)
= ln
∏m
j
(
1√
2piσ2j
exp
(−r2j
2σ2j
))
∏m
i
(
1√
2piσ2i
exp
(
−(ri+si)2
2σ2j
))
=
m∑
j
(
−r2j
2σ2j
)
−
m∑
j
(
−(rj + sj)2
2σ2j
)
=
m∑
j
(
s2j
2σ2j
)
+
m∑
j
(
rjsj
σ2j
)
. (3)
In light of rj ∼ N (0, σ2j ), we obtain that lM,D,D′ =∑m
j
s2j
2σ2j
+
∑m
j
rjsj
σ2j
also obeys a Gaussian distribution. Specif-
ically, we have lM,D,D′ ∼ N (
∑m
j
s2j
2σ2j
,
∑m
j
s2j
σ2j
). If we let H
denote
∑m
j
s2j
σ2j
, it can be re-written as lM,D,D′ ∼ N (H2 , H).
The second step is to show that Pr (lM,D,D′ ≥ ) −
e Pr (lM,D′,D ≤ −) is monotonically increasing in H . Let
us compute the first term
Pr (lM,D,D′ ≥ ) = 1√
2pi
∫ A(H)
−∞
e−x
2/2dx
where A(H) =
√
H
2 − √H . Similarly, the second term can be
re-written as
Pr (lM,D′,D ≤ −) = 1√
2pi
∫ A′(H)
−∞
e−x
2/2dx
where A′(H) = −√
H
−
√
H
2 .
Then the derivative of Pr (lM,D,D′ ≥ ) −
e Pr (lM,D′,D ≤ −) about H is:
dPr (lM,D,D′ ≥ )− e Pr (lM,D′,D ≤ −)
dH
=
1√
2pi
(
e
−(A(H))2
2 · dA(H)
dH
− ee− (A
′(H))2
2 · dA
′(H)
dH
)
=
1√
2pi
(
e
−(A(H))2
2 (
1
4
√
H
+

2
H3/2)
− ee−(A
′(H))2
2 (
−1
4
√
H
+

2
H3/2)
)
=
1√
2pi
( 1
4
√
H
(e
−(A(H))2
2 + ee
−(A′(H))2
2 )
+

2
H3/2(e
−(A(H))2
2 − e− (A
′(H))2
2 )
)
.
Since (A′(H))2 = (A(H))2 + 2, then we have
dPr (lM,D,D′ ≥ )− e Pr (lM,D′,D ≤ −)
dH
=
1√
2pi
(
1
4
√
H
(e−
(A(H))2
2 + ee−
(A′(H))2
2 )
)
≥ 0.
Therefore, Pr (lM,D,D′ ≥ )−e Pr (lM,D′,D ≤ −) is mono-
tonically increasing with H .
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Then if a function f(·) that ∆f ≤ 1 satisfies (, δ)-DP with
σ∗, the privacy loss variable l∗M,D,D′ must satisfy Eq. (2). Note
that l∗M,D,D′ is a Gaussian variable that l
∗
M,D,D′ ∼ N (H∗2 , H∗)
where H∗ =
∑m
j
(s∗j )
2
σ2∗
= 1σ2∗
. Since the left part of Eq. (2) is
monotonically increasing with H , Eq. (2) will hold for H ′ if
H ′ ≤ H∗, namely
∑m
j
s2j
σ2j
≤ 1σ2∗ .
Lemma 1 shows the condition of differential privacy when
we add noise from Gaussian distributions with different vari-
ances to different dimensions of a query function. For example,
suppose we have a 2-dimension query function f ′(·), and
s1 = 12.0, s2 = 6.0. If mechanism M satisfies (, δ)-DP with
σ∗ = 1.0, then mechanism M ′ satisfies the same (, δ)-DP
with σ1 = 17.0 and σ2 = 8.5 since 12.0
2
17.02 +
6.02
8.52 ≤ 11.02 .
Namely, we sample noise with standard deviation 17.0 for the
first dimension and 8.5 for the second dimension of f ′(·).
In contrast, previous methods sample noise from the same
Gaussian distribution N (0, 13.52) for each dimension of f ′(·)
since 12.0
2
13.52 +
6.02
13.52 ≤ 11.02 .
Continue with the above example, we conducted a numer-
ical experiment to compare the influence of different noise
distributions on the original query function. Specifically, we
calculate cosine similarity between the noisy result (M ′(D))
and the original result (f ′(D)). As a metric of such influence,
the higher similarity two results have, the less the influ-
ence of noise on the original query function. Without loss
of generality, we assume f ′(D) = (10.0, 5.0)T given that
s1 = 12.0, s2 = 6.0. We then sample noise 10000 times and
compute the average cosine similarity. When we set σ1 = 17.0
and σ2 = 8.5, the average cosine similarity between the noisy
result and the original result is 0.52. However, when we set
σ1 = σ2 = 13.5, the average is only 0.36. Another strategy is
to set σ1 = 12.4 and σ2 = 24.8, the cosine similarity in this
scenario is reduced to 0.28. Note that like the third strategy,
the optimization techniques in [13] tend to sample noise with
higher variance for dimensions with smaller sensitivity. In
other words, this numeric experiment shows that coordinates
of the query function with larger sensitivity can tolerate noise
with higher variance.
In the scenario of training a deep learning model, we
consider the gradient at each iteration as a query function of
the training dataset. Specifically, given the gradient gt at the
tth iteration, we still use si to denote the `2-sensitivity of the
ith dimension of gt. Then depending on Lemma 1, a Gaussian
mechanism Mt(x) = gt(x) + Z, where Z = (z1, . . . , zm)T
and ∀i ∈ [m], zi ∼ N (0, σ2i ), satisfies (, δ)-DP if
∑m
i=1
s2i
σ2i
≤
1
σ∗2 where , δ, σ∗ will be determined later. The remained
problem is how to calculate si and σi. Note that RMSPROP
uses the term E[g2]t−1 to estimate the average square of
historical gradients. We observe that historical gradients can
also be used to estimate the current gradient. For example, if
E[g2]it−1 > E[g2]
j
t−1, then it is quite possible that |git|> |gjt |.
In other words, E[g2]t−1 can be considered as a kind of prior
knowledge about the value of |gt|. To distinguish from the term
used in the adaptive learning rate, we use E′[g2] to denote this
prior knowledge which can be computed as follows:
E′[g2]0 =
#»
0
E′[g2]t = γ′E′[g2]t−1 + (1− γ′)(gt)2 (4)
Then depending on the prior knowledge, si can be calcu-
lated as β
√
E′[g2]it−1 where β > 0 is a parameter. Since si is
the `2-sensitivity of the ith dimension, we clip each coordinate
of the original gradient to guarantee this. Specifically, the ith
dimension of the clipped gradient (denoted by g¯it) is calculated
as:
g¯it = min{max{git,−si}, si}. (5)
In contrast with previous methods which clip the gradient with
a global `2-norm upper bound C such that ‖gt‖2≤ C, we
call our method as local clipping since it operates on each
coordinate separately and call β as local clipping factor. Then
considering
∑m
i=1
s2i
σ2i
≤ 1σ∗2 , we have σi = βσ∗
√
mE′[g2]it−1
where m is the number of dimensions. This heuristic means
that for the ith dimension of the gradient, the standard deviation
of Gaussian noise (σi) is scale to the `2-sensitivity of the ith
dimension (β
√
E′[g2]it−1). On the other hand, as the training
tends to converge, the gradual decline of
√
E′[g2]it−1 will lead
to the decrease of each σi. That means, the noise distributions
are not only adaptive to different dimensions of the gradient,
but also adaptive to different iterations of the training.
Since we have E′[g2]0 =
#»
0 at the first iteration, this value
cannot be used to clip the gradient which will cause si = 0.
We set another parameter G called local clipping threshold and
ADADP applies local clipping only when Var[E′[g2]] > G. In
other words, as a kind of prior knowledge about the gradient
gt, E′[g2]t−1 lacks sufficient information at the beginning of
the training. During this phase, ADADP applies global clipping
as follows:
g¯it =
git
max{1, ‖gt‖2/C} , (6)
where C is a parameter called `2-norm clipping bound. After
several iterations, E′[g2] will become more stable and ADADP
will perform local clipping when Var[E′[g2]] > G.
To gain more insight into the advantages of adaptive noise,
we illustrate and compare the updates of ADADP, DPSGD,
and their non-private counterparts by testing them on the Beale
function f(x, y) = (1.5−x+xy)2+(2.25−x+xy2)2+(2.625−
x + xy3)3, as shown in Figs. 1a and 1b. In this experiment,
we set γ = 0.1, γ′ = 0.9, β = 1.5 and G = 10−6.
We observe that the trajectory of DPSGD exhibits a re-
markable deviation from that of its non-private version, while
ADADP and its non-private version display similar trajectories.
Quantitatively, We define the distance between two trajectories
P = {pi}ni=1 and Q = {qi}ni=1 of the same length as
D(P,Q) = 1|P |
∑n
i=1 ‖pi − qi‖2. Note that the length of a
trajectory is the number of training iterations. The distance
between the trajectories of DPSGD and its non-private version
is 0.90 and the distance between ADADP and its non-private
version is 0.21. Experiments on all widely used test functions
for optimization [31] also show similar results.
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The above experiment suggests that adaptive noise can
mitigate the deviation of the noisy result from the original
result and the performance of ADADP is more robust to
the privacy-protecting Gaussian noise than DPSGD. Recall
that DPSGD adds Gaussian noise with the same intensity to
all dimensions. In contrast, ADADP updates each dimension
separately and the intensity of the added Gaussian noise relies
on the sensitivity of each dimension of the gradient.
−2.5 0.0 2.5
x
−4
−2
0
2
4
y
non-DP
ADADP
global minima
(a) ADADP
−2.5 0.0 2.5
x
−4
−2
0
2
4
y
non-DP
DPSGD
global minima
(b) DPSGD
Figure 1: The trajectories of ADADP, DPSGD and corresponding non-
private algorithms on Beale function with 150 training iterations.
C. Algorithm and Main Results
Now we present ADADP in Algorithm 1. Let θ0 =
{θ10, θ20, . . . , θn0 } denote the initial values of the n trainable pa-
rameters. Note that, a lot is a sample from the training dataset
which is different from batch. There can be several batches in a
lot and the lot size is the batch size multiplied with the number
of batches in it. At each step t, we compute the gradient with
per-example gradient algorithm [32] (Line 5). Then for each
dimension of the gradient, we perform the local clipping at line
Line 9 and Line 10 if the local clipping threshold is satisfied
(Line 7). After that, we calculate σi and add Gaussian noise
to the ith dimension of the gradient (Line 12 and Line 13). If
the local clipping threshold is not achieved, we perform global
clipping and add non-adaptive noise at Line 16 and Line 18.
Then we update the two expectations used in the adaptive
learning rate and the adaptive noise correspondingly (Line 22
and Line 23). Afterwards, we update the parameters at the tth
iteration with ∆θˆt (Line 26). After T training steps, ADADP
returns the final values θT = {θ1T , θ2T , . . . , θmT } (Line 28).
Before presenting our main results on the privacy guarantee
of ADADP, let us review the definition of differential privacy.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [5], [10]). A randomized
mechanism M satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy, if for any
two neighboring datasets D and D′ that differ only in one
tuple, and for any possible subset of outputs O of M , we
have
Pr(M(D) ∈ O) ≤ e · Pr(M(D′) ∈ O) + δ,
where Pr(·) denotes the probability of an event. If δ = 0, M
is said to satisfy -differential privacy.
We now show the privacy guarantee of ADADP in Theo-
rem 1.
Theorem 1. Let
(·
·
)
denote the binomial coefficient and
B(l) =
∑l
i=0(−1)i
(
l
i
)
e(i−1)i/(2σ
2
∗). Given a privacy budget
(, δ), the sampling ratio q = LN and any integer α ≥ 2, if the
Algorithm 1 ADADP
Input: examples {x1, x2, . . . , xN}, learning rate η, lot size L,
noise scale σ∗, local clipping threshold G, `2-norm clipping
bound C
Output: θT and privacy cost (, δ)
1: Initialize θ0 = {θ10, θ20, . . . , θm0 } randomly
2: for t ∈ [T ] do
3: Take a random sample Lt with probability L/N
4: Compute the gradient for each example x in Lt
5: gt(x)← ∇L(θt−1, x)
6: for the ith dimension of the gradient do
7: if Var[
√
E′[g2]t−1] > G then
8: Gradient local clipping
9: si = β
√
E′[g2]it−1
10: g¯it ← min{max{git,−si}, si}
11: Add adaptive Gaussian noise
12: σi = βσ∗
√
mE′[g2]it−1
13: g˜it ← g¯it +N (0, σ2i )
14: else
15: Gradient global clipping
16: g¯it ← g
i
t
max{1,‖gt‖2/C}
17: Add non-adaptive Gaussian noise
18: g˜it ← g¯it +N (0, C2σ2∗)
19: end if
20: end for
21: Update the expectations
22: E[g˜2]t ← (1− γ)E[g˜2]t−1 + γ(g˜t)2
23: E′[g2]t ← γ′E′[g2]t−1 + (1− γ′)(gt)2
24: Update the parameter
25: ∆θˆt ← g˜t√E[g˜2]t+0
26: θt ← θt−1 − η 1L
∑
i ∆θˆt
27: end for
28: return θT = {θ1T , θ2T , . . . , θmT }
noise scale σi in Algorithm 1 satisfies
∑m
i
s2i
σ2i
≤ 1σ2∗ and σ∗
satisfies
T
α− 1 log
(
1 + q2
(
α
2
)
min{4(e1/σ2∗ − 1), 2e1/σ2∗}
+ 4
α∑
j=3
qj
(
α
j
)√
B(2dj/2e) ·B(2bj/2c)
)
+
log(1/δ)
α− 1 ≤ ,
(7)
then Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-differentially private.
To prove Theorem 1, we use the techniques of RDP to
analyze the privacy cost of the composition of Gaussian
mechanisms. The results that we obtain via RDP are later
translated to DP.
Definition 2 (Re´nyi Divergence [14]). Given two probability
distributions P and Q, the Re´nyi divergence between P and
Q with order α > 1 is defined by
Dα(P ||Q) = 1
α− 1 logEx∼Q
(P (x)
Q(x)
)α
.
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Definition 3 (Re´nyi differential privacy [14]). A randomized
mechanism f : D → Rd is said to be (α, )-Re´nyi differential
private if for any adjacent datasets D,D′, it holds that
Dα(f(D)||f(D′)) ≤ .
Our proofs are based on the three key properties of RDP,
as stated in Lemmas 3 to 5.
Lemma 3 (RDP of Gaussian Mechanism [14]). If ‖f(·)‖2≤ 1,
then the Gaussian mechanism M(D) = f(D) + N (0, σ2)
satisfies (α, α/(2σ2))-RDP.
Lemma 4 (Composition of RDP [14]). For two randomized
mechanisms f, g such that f is (α, 1)-RDP and g is (α, 2)-
RDP, the composition of f and g which is defined as (X,Y )
(a sequence of results), where X ∼ f and Y ∼ g, satisfies
(α, 1 + 2)-RDP.
Lemma 5 (Translation from RDP to DP [14]). If a randomized
mechanism f : D → Rd satisfies (α, )-RDP, then it satisfies
(+ log 1/δα−1 , δ)-DP where 0 < δ < 1.
Lemma 6 analyzes the privacy amplification in the subsam-
pling setting.
Lemma 6 (RDP of subsampled Gaussian Mechanism [15]).
Define function B(, l) =
∑l
i=0(−1)i
(
l
i
)
e(i−1)(i). Given
a dataset D of n records and a Gaussian mechanism f
satisfying (α, (α))-RDP, define a new randomized mechanism
f ◦subsample as: (1) subsample m records where q = m/n,
(2) apply these m records as the input of mechanism f , then
for any integer α > 1, f ◦ subsample satisfies (α, ′(α))-
RDP, where:
′(α) ≤ 1
α− 1 log
(
1 + q2
(
α
2
)
min{4(e1/σ2−1), 2e1/σ2}
+ 4
α∑
j=3
qj
(
α
j
)√
B(2dj/2e) ·B(2bj/2c)
)
. (8)
Before showing the proof of Theorem 1, we need to
establish the following important lemma. In Lemma 7, we
bound the noise level σ of a Gaussian mechanism in the
subsampling setting.
Lemma 7. Given the sampling probability q = L/N , the
number of steps T , the Gaussian mechanism M = f(·) +
N (0, σ2) where ‖f(·) ‖2≤ 1, then the composition of T these
mechanisms satisfies (, δ)-differentially private if σ satisfies:
T
α− 1 log
(
1 + q2
(
α
2
)
min{4(e1/σ2 − 1), 2e1/σ2} (9)
+ 4
α∑
j=3
qj
(
α
j
)√
B(2dj/2e) ·B(2bj/2c)
)
+
log(1/δ)
α− 1 ≤ ,
(10)
where α can be any integer satisfying α ≥ 2 and the function
B is defined as B(l) =
∑l
i=0(−1)i
(
l
i
)
e(i−1)i/(2σ
2).
Proof. By Lemma 3, we could compute B(, l) defined in
Lemma 6 on Gaussian mechanisms as
B(l) =
l∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
l
i
)
e(i−1)i/(2σ
2). (11)
Since a lot used in ADADP is a subsample of the training
dataset, each step is (α, ′(α))-RDP where ′(α) satisfies (8)
in Lemma 6. Then after T training steps of ADADP, we could
obtain the total privacy cost (α, T′(α)) via composing such
T subsampled Gaussian mechanisms depending on Lemma
4. Then by substituting the function B(, l) in (8) with (11),
T′(α) can be clearly expressed as
T′(α) ≤ T
α− 1 log
(
1 + q2
(
α
2
)
min{4(e1/σ2 − 1), 2e1/σ2}
+ 4
α∑
j=3
qj
(
α
j
)√
B(2dj/2e) ·B(2bj/2c)
)
. (12)
At last, through converting (α, T′(α)) to DP representation
via Lemma 5, ADADP satisfies (T′(α) + log(1/δ)α−1 , δ)-DP. Let
T′(α) + log(1/δ)α−1 ≤  where  is the given privacy budget and
combine this with (12) as follows:
T
α− 1 log
(
1 + q2
(
α
2
)
min{4(e1/σ2 − 1), 2e1/σ2}
+ 4
α∑
j=3
qj
(
α
j
)√
B(2dj/2e) ·B(2bj/2c)
)
+
log(1/δ)
α− 1 ≤ ,
then the proof is completed.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof. Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 7, Theorem 1 is
easy to prove. Suppose we use M(D) = f(D) + Z as a
Gaussian mechanism at training step t in Algorithm 1, then
the composition of such T mechanisms satisfies Eq. (9). Based
on Lemma 1, if we use M ′(D) = f ′(D)+Z ′ at each training
step t in which
∑m
i=1
s2i
σ2i
≤ 1σ2∗ , then M
′(D) satisfies the
same differential privacy guarantee as M(D). Therefore, the
proof of Lemma 7 is also suitable for M ′(D). Combine this
fact with the post-processing property of DP [33], the proof
is completed.
We would like to remark that Theorem 1 covers the realm
of small noise and high sampling ratio that the moments
accountant method [10] omits (which requires σ ≥ 1 and
q < 116σ ). For instance, if we train a model using ADADP
with L = 600 and σ∗ = 0.9 on a dataset of N = 60000
examples, Theorem 1 bounds the privacy cost by choosing
the optimal α = 6 and implies that the model achieves
(4.0, 10−5)-differential privacy after 1800 training steps.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Evaluation Setup
We evaluate the privacy cost, the accuracy and the compu-
tational efficiency of ADADP compared with state-of-the-art
methods: DPSGD [10], AGD [11] and DPOPT [13] on two real
datasets: MNIST and CIFAR-10. We implemented all these
algorithms using TensorFlow [34] with a GTX 1080Ti GPU.
MNIST is a standard dataset for handwritten digit recogni-
tion, which consists of 60,000 training examples and 10,000
testing examples. Each example is a 28×28 gray-level image.
CIFAR-10 consists of 60,000 labeled examples of 32 × 32
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RGB images. There are 50,000 training images and 10,000
testing images.
The model for MNIST task first performs a 60-dimensional
differentially private PCA (DPPCA) projection [35] and then
applies a single 1,000-unit ReLU hidden layer [36]. For the
CIFAR-10 task, we use a variant of AlexNet [37], which
contains two convolutional layers followed by two fully con-
nected layers and one softmax layer. The first convolutional
layer includes 64 filters of size 5 × 5 with stride 1. The
layer is followed by the ReLU activation, 2× 2 max pooling,
and local response normalization. The structure of the second
convolutional layer is identical to that of the first one except
that the local response normalization is performed before max
pooling. The output is then flattened into a vector as the input
for the following fully connected layer.
As outlined in Algorithm 1, we compute gradients for each
training example. However, it is prohibitive to compute per-
example gradients due to the parameter sharing scheme of
convolutional layers. Since convolutional layers are shown to
be well transferred [38], we pre-train the model on CIFAR-100
and initialize the network with the trained parameters. When
we train it on CIFAR-10, the parameters of convolutional lay-
ers are maintained and updates happen to the fully connected
layers and the softmax layers.
We use the result of Theorem 1 to calculate the privacy cost.
Specifically, given , σ∗, and q, at each iteration, we select α’s
from {2, 3, . . . , 64} and determine the smallest δ∗ that satisfies
(7) in Theorem 1. The privacy cost is the pair (, δ∗).
For ADADP, we set γ = 0.1, γ′ = 0.9 and G = 10−6
in all experiments. For AGD, since it was only evaluated on
shallow machine learning tasks in [11], its privacy computation
is not suitable for deep learning as it does not consider
the privacy amplification due to subsampling. Therefore, we
use Theorem 1 to compute the privacy guarantee for AGD
to give a fair comparison. To implement DPOPT1, we use
the projected gradient descent algorithm and optimize the
objective function with 50 steps as the same as [13].
B. Privacy Cost
Dataset Accuracy δ∗ D A
MNIST
0.92
10−4
1.10 0.75
0.94 1.61 0.78
0.95 1.96 0.80
0.96 5.48 1.40
CIFAR-10
0.68
10−4
0.89 0.62
0.69 1.85 1.07
0.70 4.75 2.13
0.71 8.36 3.55
Table I: Results on the privacy cost of DPSGD and ADADP
To illustrate the trade-off between the privacy cost and
the accuracy, we measured the privacy cost of ADADP and
DPSGD to attain a pre-specified accuracy level. We set the
noise level σ∗ = 3.0 and σp = 6.0 on MNIST and σ∗ = 4.0
on CIFAR-10, where σp is the noise level for DPPCA [35].
1In the equation that precedes (10a) in [13], the quadratic term in the
moment generating function of a Gaussian distribution was missing. This
equation should be
∑d
i
∆2i
σ2i
≤ 2
1+λ
+ 2
λ+λ2
ln δ.
Compared with DPSGD (as a representative method with
a non-adaptive learning rate), ADADP achieves an average
reduction of 54% and 46% in privacy cost on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 respectively. Table I summarizes the results, where
D and A denote the minimum privacy cost required by
DPSGD and ADADP, respectively, to attain the pre-specified
accuracy level. We observe that ADADP always requires much
lower privacy cost than DPSGD to achieve the same accuracy
level. This is mainly due to the faster convergence and fewer
training steps of ADADP.
C. Accuracy
Furthermore, given a fixed privacy budget, we evaluate
the accuracy of ADADP, DPSGD, AGD and DPOPT on
both MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets under the high privacy
level, the medium privacy level and the low privacy level
respectively. In all experiments on MNIST, we set the lot
size L = 600 and `2-norm clipping bound C = 4.0. For
ADADP, we set the local clipping factor β = 1.2. The noise
levels (σ∗, σp) for training the fully connected layer and the
DPPCA layer are set to (8, 16), (4, 7), and (2, 4), respectively,
for the three experiments. When testing DPSGD and DPOPT,
we set the initial learning rate to 0.1 and linearly drop it down
to 0.052 after 10 epochs and then keep it constant. When
applying ADADP, we set the learning rate η to 0.002 and keep
it unchanged. On CIFAR-10, we set the noise level σ∗ = 6.0,
lot size L = 2000, `2-norm clipping bound C = 3.0 for
fully connected layers and C = 6.0 for the softmax layer. For
ADADP, we set the local clipping factor β = 1.2. For DPSGD
and DPOPT, we set the initial learning rate to 0.1 and apply
an exponentially decaying schedule in the first experiment and
set the learning rate to 0.052 in the last two experiments. For
ADADP, the learning rate η is set to 0.001.
The accuracy achieved by ADADP significantly outperforms
that of DPSGD, AGD and DPOPT under all three privacy
levels on both MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. Fig. 2 illustrates
how the accuracy varies with the number of epochs and δ∗ on
MNIST. The gray line and the black line (please refer to the
right vertical axis) denote the accumulating privacy cost for
AGD and other methods respectively in terms of δ∗ given a
fixed . We observe that the final test accuracy of ADADP
on the MNIST achieves an increase of 5.9%, 2.7% and 1.0%
respectively compared with DPSGD, 8.8%, 9.5% and 6.7%
respectively compared with AGD, 4.3%, 1.5% and 0.7%
respectively compared with DPOPT. The results on CIFAR-
10 are shown in Fig. 3. In all three settings, ADADP achieves
an accuracy increase of 3.2%, 5.3% and 4.8% respectively
compared with DPSGD, 8.5%, 8.0% and 6.9% respectively
compared with AGD, 2.1%, 3.5% and 3.2% respectively
compared with DPOPT.
We now analyze how we achieve higher accuracy than each
state-of-the-art method respectively. Compared with DPSGD,
the performance improvement of ADADP is achieved by
both the adaptive learning rate and the adaptive noise. As
to AGD, σ in this algorithm can only decrease gradually
which cannot be reversed such that the privacy budget is
consumed too fast. Generally, a few epochs of training are
not enough to guarantee the convergence for deep learning
models. Therefore, AGD performs poorly in deep learning.
For DPOPT, on the one hand, ADADP adopts an adaptive
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Figure 2: Results on the accuracy for different privacy levels on MNIST dataset.
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Figure 3: Results on the accuracy for different privacy levels on CIFAR-10 dataset.
learning rate to improve the convergence. On the other hand, as
our first numeric experiment indicates, ADADP samples noise
with higher variance for dimensions of the gradient with larger
sensitivity which mitigates the influence of noise significantly.
In addition, the expected variance of each noise distribution
will gradually decrease as the training progresses.
D. Computational Efficiency
Dataset ADADP DPSGD AGD DPOPT
MNIST 0.5s 0.3s 12.0s 15.5s
CIFAR-10 1.2s 0.9s 23.7s 19.1s
Table II: Results on the computational efficiency.
In addition, we evaluate the average processing time of
ADADP, DPSGD, AGD and DPOPT per iteration, as a mea-
sure of computational efficiency. The time involves processing
a whole batch where we set the batch size as 120 on MNIST
and 32 on CIFAR-10 respectively. Other settings are the same
as Fig. 2a and Fig. 3a respectively.
ADADP is much more computationally efficient than both
AGD and DPOPT. The results are shown in Table II. We
observe that for each iteration, the average processing time of
ADADP is close to that of DPSGD which is far shorter than the
other two algorithms. Note that AGD repeatedly evaluates the
model multiple times to obtain the best update step size while
DPOPT needs to solve a non-convex optimization problem
with variables as many as the parameters of the deep learning
model. In contrast to AGD and DPOPT, ADADP adopts a
heuristic to avoid heavy computation at each iteration.
E. Micro Benchmarks
Considering there are two components in ADADP, namely
the adaptive learning rate and the adaptive noise, we study
their independent contribution to the final performance in this
subsection. We call the methods with only one component
ADAL (only adaptive learning rate) and ADAN (only adaptive
noise) respectively. ADAL uses global clipping method to clip
the original gradient and samples noise for each dimension
from the same Gaussian distribution. The only difference
between ADAL and DPSGD is that ADAL adjusts the learning
rate based on Eq. (1). As to ADAN, we implement it directly
by removing the adaptive learning rate part in ADADP. For
the experiment on MNIST, the learning rate is set to 0.1 and
0.001 for ADAN and ADAL respectively. Other settings are
the same as Fig. 2a. On CIFAR-10, the learning rate is set to
0.05 and 0.001 for ADAN and ADAL respectively and other
settings are the same as Fig. 3a.
Both adaptive components contribute to the performance
gain of ADADP while the adaptive noise component con-
tributes more. As illustrated in Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b, we
observe that ADAN achieves a higher accuracy than ADAL,
showing that, compared with the adaptive learning rate, the
adaptive noise component has a more significant impact on
the performance of ADADP.
Since ADADP depends on whether the estimation of√
E′[g2]t−1 is accurate for |gt|, we further conducted another
experiment to verify its effectiveness under the settings as the
same as Fig. 2a.
The estimation given by
√
E′[g2]t−1 is accurate and can
reflect the changing trend of |gt|. The results are shown
in Fig. 4c, from which we observe that the distribution of√
E′[g2]t−1 (the figure below) is close to that of |gt| (the
figure above) at each iteration. Also, from the 100th iteration to
the 1000th iteration, both the gradient value and the estimated
value show a declining trend.
Additionally, as aforementioned, given the expected sensi-
tivity of the gradient decreases with the training progresses,
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Figure 4: The micro benchmarks of key components in ADADP.
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Figure 5: The sensitivity of different parameters on the accuracy of ADADP.
each σi will also decrease gradually. We select the σi in
ADADP at the 100th iteration and the 1000th iteration respec-
tively to illustrate this property. All the settings are the same
as Fig. 2a.
The standard deviation of most noise distributions for each
coordinate of the gradient gradually decreases as the training
progresses. As shown in Fig. 4d (the area of each circle is
proportional to the value of σi), we observe that most σi at
the 1000th iteration (the figure below) are more concentrated in
the range less than 10 while there are many σi distributed from
10 to 20 at the 100th iteration (the figure above). Therefore,
the noise distributions in ADADP are adaptive not only to
each dimension of the gradient, but also to different iterations
during training.
F. Impact of Parameters
In this set of experiments on the MNIST dataset, we study
the impact of the learning rate, the local clipping factor, the
noise level and the lot size on the accuracy. In all experiments,
if not specified, we set the learning rate η = 0.002, lot size
L = 600, local clipping factor β = 1.2, `2-norm clipping
bound C = 4.0, noise level σ∗ = 8.0, σp = 16.0, and privacy
level  = 0.5, δ = 1e−5.
Learning Rate. As shown in Fig. 5a, the accuracy stays
consistently above 93%, irrespective of the learning rate rang-
ing from 0.08×10−2 to 0.5×10−2. When the learning rate is
lower than 2× 10−2, the accuracy increases with the learning
rate. When it is higher than 2 × 10−2, a higher learning rate
results in a lower accuracy.
Local Clipping Factor. The local clipping factor β controls
the scale of each dimension of the gradient. Note that the
estimation
√
E[′[g2]t−1] is not equal to |gt|, a smaller β drops
more information of the gradient since some dimensions will
be clipped as si or −si. Fig. 5b shows that the performance of
ADADP is relatively resistant to the local clipping factor and a
reasonable setting for β is to take a value slightly greater than
one. However, due to the adaptive noise scheme of ADADP,
a large value of β will not raise the noise level drastically
(especially because when the gradient is close to 0 as the
training converges, si will also be close to 0 whatever β takes).
Noise Scale. The noise scale determines the amount of
Gaussian noise added to the update term at each step. Although
a smaller noise scale mitigates the effect of noises, it results
in fewer training steps and the model is hard to converge.
Meanwhile, setting a larger noise scale allows more training
steps, but excessive noise will ruin the original gradient. Re-
sults achieved with different noise scales are shown in Fig. 5c,
where our model attains the most superior performance with
σ∗ = 7.0. Compared with DPSGD, which reaches the highest
accuracy at σ∗ = 4.0 [10], we attribute the much larger value
of σ∗ of ADADP to adaptive noises which alleviate the impact
of the differential privacy mechanism and a larger noise scale
yields more training steps.
Lot Size. The lot size controls the sampling ratio. A large
lot size yields a higher sampling ratio and reduces the number
of training steps. If the noise intensity is fixed, a smaller lot
size results in a more notable effect of Gaussian noise. Fig. 5d
shows the accuracy vs. the lot size. It can be observed that as
the lot size grows, the performance increases initially, peaks
at L = 800, and finally declines. The result agrees with the
above analysis that too high too low sampling ratio will incur
performance degradation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, our key contribution is three-fold. First,
we propose a differentially private deep learning algorithm
which leads to a faster convergence and higher accuracy in
comparison with prior methods. Second, we intuitively analyze
advantages of ADADP over DPSGD and mathematically prove
that ADADP satisfies differential privacy by more advanced
analytic tools. Third, we applied ADADP, DPSGD, AGD
and DPOPT for model training of deep learning networks
with real-world datasets and experimentally evaluate the better
performance of ADADP.
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